PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF ROS 2 NETWORKS USING VARIABLE QUALITY OF SERVICE AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS FOR AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS by Chen, Zhaolin
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2019-09
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF ROS 2
NETWORKS USING VARIABLE QUALITY OF
SERVICE AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS FOR
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
Chen, Zhaolin
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/63441
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.








PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF ROS 2 NETWORKS USING 
VARIABLE QUALITY OF SERVICE AND SECURITY 




Thesis Advisor: Preetha Thulasiraman 
Second Reader: Brian S. Bingham 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 September 2019  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master's thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF ROS 2 NETWORKS USING VARIABLE 
QUALITY OF SERVICE AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS FOR 
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 6. AUTHOR(S) Zhaolin Chen 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)   
 This thesis studies the network performance of the Robot Operating System (ROS) 2 when used in a 
network of nodes similar to how a group of unmanned assets would operate. Specifically, this thesis 
evaluates the impact of combining varying Quality of Service (QoS) and security settings in the ROS 2. It 
also explores the effect that scaling to multiple nodes has on network performance. This is the first work to 
comprehensively study ROS 2 network performance using QoS and security classification as a function of 
scale and message size. Network performance metrics include latency and message drop rate between nodes. 
Our research uniquely integrates ROS 2 with NS-3, developing a simulation architecture that is effective for 
rapidly studying ROS 2 network performance. Our simulation results demonstrated the trade-offs in 
choosing different QoS policies as well as the trade-offs in performance when security settings were 
enabled. We found that enabling security resulted in a higher message drop rate across all QoS profiles. We 
also found that scaling the network to more nodes resulted in various consequences with the use of different 
QoS settings. Scaling up to more nodes in a network also resulted in an equivalent increase in the average 
latency of messages. This work contributes to evaluating and configuring ROS 2 parameters for different 
unmanned system use cases while providing a simulation framework on which tests can be run. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
ROS2, Robot Operating System 2, NS3 network simulator, QOS, quality of service, network 
performance 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 87 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF ROS 2 NETWORKS USING VARIABLE 
QUALITY OF SERVICE AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS FOR 
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 
Zhaolin Chen 
Major, Republic of Singapore Air Force 
BEE, National University of Singapore, 2007 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
September 2019 
Approved by: Preetha Thulasiraman 
 Advisor 
 Brian S. Bingham 
 Second Reader 
 Douglas J. Fouts 
 Chair, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 This thesis studies the network performance of the Robot Operating System 
(ROS) 2 when used in a network of nodes similar to how a group of unmanned assets 
would operate. Specifically, this thesis evaluates the impact of combining varying 
Quality of Service (QoS) and security settings in the ROS 2. It also explores the effect 
that scaling to multiple nodes has on network performance. This is the first work to 
comprehensively study ROS 2 network performance using QoS and security 
classification as a function of scale and message size. Network performance metrics 
include latency and message drop rate between nodes. Our research uniquely integrates 
ROS 2 with NS-3, developing a simulation architecture that is effective for rapidly 
studying ROS 2 network performance. Our simulation results demonstrated the trade-offs 
in choosing different QoS policies as well as the trade-offs in performance when security 
settings were enabled. We found that enabling security resulted in a higher message drop 
rate across all QoS profiles. We also found that scaling the network to more nodes 
resulted in various consequences with the use of different QoS settings. Scaling up to 
more nodes in a network also resulted in an equivalent increase in the average latency of 
messages. This work contributes to evaluating and configuring ROS 2 parameters for 
different unmanned system use cases while providing a simulation framework on which 
tests can be run. 
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A. UNMANNED SYSTEMS 
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) were first used in a military application in 1849, 
where unmanned balloons were used to attack the city of Venice, Italy. Modern-day 
unmanned systems (UxS) gained prominence with the use of UAVs by the Israeli Air Force 
in their victory over the Syrian Air Force [1]. Since then, the military application for UxS 
has continued to grow in popularity, with UxS used in the air, surface, and subsurface 
domains.  
Advances in the technology of UxS have enabled their use in a growing variety of 
military applications. One such advance is the development of mini and micro UxS. Their 
small size makes them cheaper, easier to deploy, and able to access physical areas which 
larger UxS cannot. The small size of these UxS also brings with them their own limitations. 
These include a small payload size and a small communication range. These limitations 
can be overcome through the use of swarming tactics, which allows the interaction between 
all UxS entities to achieve a common goal. In [2], the author demonstrates multiple 
situations where the limitations of UxS could be overcome through the use of swarm 
tactics. An example of swarming tactics is the use of multiple micro UxS to conduct search 
or reconnaissance of a single large area. 
In [3], the authors explain how UxS are seen as game changers for the military in 
the additional capabilities that this technology brings. Yet, the introduction of UxS 
technology for both military and civilian applications has brought with it its own set of 
challenges. The Unmanned System Integrated Roadmap (2017–2042) released by the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD), listed interoperability and network security as critical UxS 
needs [4]. Interoperability is described as allowing for interactions between systems and 
allowing for information to be transmitted in a timely fashion between different users. A 
common or open architecture is seen as a key enabler for interoperability. Network security 
is described as being vital to protect the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of 
information flow between UxS assets. 
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B. ROBOT OPERATING SYSTEM AS A COMMON FRAMEWORK 
One of the difficulties in the development of any new robotics or UxS program lies 
in the amount of resources required to establish the software infrastructure. Code has to be 
written to interface and drive the hardware within the system being developed. This means 
that across multiple programs, the software infrastructure has to be re-developed instead of 
being reused. The use of a common software infrastructure would mitigate this wastage of 
resources, as well as any interoperability issues. 
The Robot Operating System (ROS) was developed as a framework that provided 
the software infrastructure on which others could build their UxS. As a framework, ROS 
provides a set of tools and libraries that simplify the task of creating a new robot. ROS is 
now managed by Open Robotics as a free and open-source software. It has built up a large 
set of tools supported by an equally large ROS community, which any developer can 
utilize. 
The second version of ROS, ROS 2, was initiated by the Open Source Robotics 
Foundation, the predecessor of Open Robotics, to address the shortcomings of ROS 1 that 
were identified by the industry. Deficiencies of ROS 1 include the fact that it is dependent 
on a central node (roscore), which is seen as single point of failure for any UxS. ROS 1 
was also built without cyber security in mind, and while there were attempts to secure the 
software, it was concluded that a redevelopment of the framework from the ground-up 
would be required to address cyber security concerns. ROS 2 was first released in 2015, 
while the first version with long term support (LTS) was released in June 2019. 
ROS-M is the militarized version of ROS and is built upon the ROS 2 framework. 
ROS-M is meant to address the specific needs of military UxS. Similar to the purpose of 
ROS, ROS-M seeks to reduce development cost by promoting code sharing and reuse. It 
also seeks to meet security requirements of the military. In addition to the lower cost 
associated with the use of a common platform, the use of ROS 2 would enable ROS-M to 
tap into the existing work executed by many researchers and industry participants. 
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C. THESIS CONTRIBUTION 
In this thesis, we assess the network performance of ROS 2 when used in a network 
of nodes similar to how a group of UxS would operate. Given the recent introduction of 
ROS 2, there have not been many studies of the network performance of ROS 2. 
Information regarding network performance when different Quality of Service (QoS) and 
security settings are enabled contributes to evaluating and configuring ROS 2 for different 
UxS use cases.  
For this thesis, simulations are performed using NS-3, which is a discrete-event 
network simulator. Our tests focus on the effect of QoS network settings, security settings 
and scalability, on network performance. Network performance is evaluated based on 
message transmission latency and message loss rate.  
The contributions of this thesis are: 
• Development of a simulation framework that integrates NS-3 and ROS 2, 
allowing for the network performance of multiple ROS 2 nodes to be 
evaluated without the need for multiple hardware to host the ROS 2 nodes.  
• Simulation and evaluation of the network performance with ROS 2 nodes 
under varying QoS profiles. 
• Simulation and evaluation of the network performance with ROS 2 nodes 
with security settings turned on and off. 
• Simulation and evaluation of the network performance of two ROS 2 
nodes versus five ROS 2 nodes.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that comprehensively studies 
ROS 2 network performance using QoS and security classifications as a function of scale 
and message size.  
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D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter II, we provide an 
overview of the ROS 2 architecture, as well as the available QoS and security settings. We 
also study the related work on the network performance of ROS 2. In Chapter III, we 
describe the simulation setup of how NS-3 is used to simulate the network between 
multiple ROS 2 nodes. In addition, the chapter details the expected effect of each QoS and 
security setting. In Chapter IV, we present the simulations results and discuss the 
significant implications for each of the performance metrics studied. Finally, we draw 
conclusions and propose recommendations for future work in Chapter V. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH WORK 
A. ROS 2 ARCHITECTURE 
ROS 1 was first developed to be used with the Willow Garage PR2 robot. The PR2 
robot enabled the development team to showcase the capabilities of what ROS 1 could do. 
This meant that development choices of ROS 1 were partly guided by the use case of the 
PR2 robot as explained in [5]. This resulted in development decisions such as the use of a 
central node as well as assuming that optimum network connectivity existed, given that all 
nodes were physically on a single robot. Also, communication between nodes was not 
secured from a cyber security perspective. The vulnerability of ROS 1 was shown in [6], 
when the authors searched the entire Internet Protocol version 4 (IPV4) space of the 
internet for ROS 1 instances that were exposed to the public. The authors were then able 
to read data and control multiple ROS 1 nodes given the lack of security of the 
communications. 
ROS 2 addresses many of the shortcomings of ROS 1. One significant change is 
the use of the Data Distribution Service (DDS) for communication between nodes in ROS 
2. DDS is a middleware framework to address the need for real-time data exchange by 
various applications. As part of the framework, messages are exchanged between nodes 
using the Real-Time Publish-Subscribe (RTPS) protocol. The use of DDS means that ROS 
2 is able to make use of features implemented by supported DDS vendors. The 
implementation of QoS and security settings is handled within the DDS application. Users 
do not have to change their code should there be any programming change in the DDS 
layer as it would be taken care of by the ROS interface between the application and the 
DDS layer. All ROS code would be agnostic to the DDS implementation, while all DDS 
code would be agnostic to the ROS code, with the intra-process application programming 
interface (API) handling the interface between the two. Figure 1 illustrates how the ROS 
application layer works with the DDS middleware. 
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Figure 1. ROS 2 architecture and DDS. Adapted from [7]. 
ROS 2 currently supports three different DDS vendors as shown in Table 1. The 
different DDS vendors are expected to be compatible, as they are implementations of the 
same DDS framework. As such, each node in a network could be using a different DDS 
vendor and still be able to communicate with the others. 
Table 1. List of DDS vendors supported by ROS. Adapted from [8]. 
Product Name License Status 
eProsima Fast RTPS Commercial, Research Full support available. 
RTI Connext Commercial, Research Full support available. Needs to 
be installed separately 
ADLINK Opensplice Apache 2, Commercial Only partial support available. 
Needs to be installed separately 
OSRF FreeRTPS Apache 2 Only partial support available. 
Development paused. 
 
B. ROS 2 QUALITY OF SERVICE SETTINGS 
ROS 1 originally made use of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) as its 
transport protocol. TCP, however, is unsuitable for use in a lossy wireless network. ROS 
2’s use of DDS makes it more suitable for use in a lossy network. DDS uses the RTPS 
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protocol, which was designed to run over an unreliable network, using the User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP).  
On top of the UDP layer, DDS allows for different QoS policies, providing the user 
with control over the behavior of the network. These policies address four main aspects of 
network performance: Real-time Delivery, Bandwidth, Redundancy, and Persistence. 
Although DDS supports a multitude of QoS policies, as of the ROS 2 Dashing Diademata 
release, ROS 2 only supports seven different policies. The policies are: History, Depth, 
Reliability, Durability, Deadline, Lifespan, and Liveliness. The last three policies are 
newly supported in the Dashing Diademata release, with the first three releases only 
supporting the first four policies. Table 2 provides a description of each QoS policy 
supported by ROS 2. This thesis focuses on the first four policies: History, Depth, 
Reliability, and Durability. 
Table 2. Description of ROS 2 QoS policies 
QoS Policy Description 
History There are two settings, “Keep last” and “Keep all.” History serves to 
configure the number of messages that the Publisher or Subscriber will 
keep in its cache. 
Depth Size of the queue if “Keep last” is configured as the history setting. 
Reliability There are two settings, “Reliable” and “Best effort.” The Reliable 
setting helps ensure that all messages are delivered. Best effort 
attempts to send each message only once. 
Durability This policy determines whether the Publisher sends past messages to a 
newly joined Subscriber.  
Deadline Ensures that messages are sent or received within a specified duration. 
Lifespan Determines the duration for which a message is valid. 
Liveliness Configures the Publisher and the Subscriber to check that the 
connection is still valid. 
 
In [7], the authors compared the network performance of ROS 1 and ROS 2. The 
authors showed that the use of DDS middleware did indeed help address the short-falls in 
ROS 1. This included the fact that a user no longer had to launch a Subscriber node before 
the Publisher node, as the Durability QoS policy in DDS ensured that the Publisher still 
receives messages published before it was launched. ROS 2, however, showed large 
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latency increases when the message size was increased. This was attributed to the fact that 
RTPS was designed for lightweight communication. As such, messages were divided into 
small packet sizes, with a corresponding increase in overhead when the message size was 
large.  
In [9], the authors measured the latency for messages using three different DDS 
vendor implementations. There were minimal differences among each implementation, 
with all three implementations demonstrating similar impact on network performance 
depending on the QoS policies used. 
The work in this thesis extends the existing research by exploring the impact of 
varying QoS profiles within a lossy network. We also explore the specific impact that 
different QoS policies have on network performance. Given the similarities in DDS 
implementation, eProsima Fast RTPS was used for our simulations, as it’s the default 
middleware chosen by ROS2.  
C. SECURE ROS 2 
DDS security features are made available for use with ROS 2 through a set of tools 
named Secure ROS 2 (SROS 2). Through SROS 2, ROS 2 as the application layer checks 
for security settings in the application layer and executes the appropriate security plugins 
in the middleware layer.  
1. DDS-Security 
Figure 2 depicts how the ROS 2 application, DDS middleware and security plugins 
interact with one another. 
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Figure 2. Interaction between application component, DDS, and security 
plugins. Source: [10]. 
DDS-Security is a set of specifications that expands on the original DDS and 
includes a set of Service Plugin Interfaces (SPI). SPIs implement the security model as 
defined or required by the user [10]. As of the Dashing Diademata version, ROS 2 makes 
use of only three SPIs. The three SPIs are: 
• Authentication: Verification of the identity of the Publisher/Subscriber 
nodes. 
• Access Control: Enforces to which topics the authenticated nodes can 
publish or subscribe. 
• Cryptography: Implementation of cryptographic operations. DDS has 
separate SPIs that perform encryption, signing as well as hashing. 
A user can choose to use one of the SPIs or all of them as part of the security model 
desired.  
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2. ROS 2 Security Settings and Roadmap 
The security features in DDS-Security are only accessible to the user in ROS 2 via 
SROS 2. SROS 2 currently does not allow the user to define the SPIs used by the DDS. 
The settings available to the user are limited to the following:  
• A global setting to apply security to all nodes in the network. The setting 
would apply authentication, access control, and encryption to 
communications between all nodes.  
• Controlling access of each specific node through authentication and access 
control. 
• Allowing the user to control whether the security settings are to be 
enforced. If the settings are not to be enforced, security would only be 
applied when the related security files are found. If security needs to be 
enforced, the node would not be initiated when the security files cannot be 
found.  
The roadmap for ROS 2 development includes plans to allow the user to have finer 
control over the security settings in the future [11]. This includes the ability to define the 
SPIs that are used for cryptography (allowing the user to perform only signing, for 
example). Control over the type of SPIs used will allow a user to understand the appropriate 
trade-offs between performance and security requirements. ROS 2 also currently stores the 
security keys in file storage, with the roadmap planning to improve the means of key 
generation and storage.  
3. Performance 
At the ROSCON 2018 conference, authors from the DDS vendor Real Time 
Innovations (RTI) presented the results from the study that they did on the impact of 
network performance at the DDS layer itself [12]. The study made use of RTI Connext 
DDS and explored the impact that turning on security settings had on latency and 
throughput. Simulations were performed using eight different message sizes (32 Bytes, 256 
Bytes, 2 Kbytes, 16 Kbytes, 128 Kbytes, and 1 Mbytes) and four security settings (No 
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security, Sign message, Sign message + Encryption, Sign message + Encryption + Origin 
Authentication). Results showed that using sign message, encryption, and origin 
authentication, similar to what is used for ROS 2, caused a 25%–41% overhead in terms of 
latency. It also resulted in an overhead of 1%–32% in terms of throughput. There was also 
no noticeable difference in impact when scalability was taken into consideration, with 
simulations run on one, two, and four Subscribers. 
In [13], the authors conducted experiments with ROS 2 to examine the overhead 
incurred when security was enabled. When performed using two nodes in a single computer 
with a lossless network, having security enabled incurred an overhead of 32% in 
throughput and 37% in latency. The authors also presented the results from running the 
experiments performed using two computers with a lossy wireless network and QoS profile 
set as Reliable. The authors found that the overhead increased linearly as a function of 
message size. 
In [14], the authors compared the impact on performance of using SROS 2 versus 
using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to secure communications between two nodes. The 
authors noted that the overhead for SROS 2 was significantly higher than that of a VPN in 
terms of latency. A VPN also had a minimal impact on throughput, while SROS 2 caused 
a significant decrease in throughput. Hardware constraints, however, could limit the use of 
a VPN. Most VPN protocols also do not inherently support multicast features, which makes 
it difficult to implement in a swarm network if each node needed to communicate with the 
others.  
Existing work focuses on the impact of SROS 2 on network performance between 
two nodes. The work in this thesis extends this to exploring the network performance when 
scaled up to more nodes, with varying QoS profiles and with SROS 2.  
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III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND SETUP 
In this chapter, we describe the simulation architecture used to evaluate the network 
performance of ROS 2. The architecture allows for the simulations to be carried out with 
different network settings like antenna and transmit power, as well as QoS and security 
settings, as required. 
A. ROS 2 COMMUNICATIONS 
ROS 1 utilizes a Publisher/Subscriber architecture to pass messages between nodes. 
Nodes register with a ROS master through which the nodes can discover other nodes. 
Depending on the topic that the nodes are subscribed to, they then establish communications 
with the relevant nodes that are subscribed to the same topics.  
ROS 2 utilizes a similar Publisher/Subscriber architecture, but without a ROS master. 
Instead ROS 2 makes use of DDS as its messaging layer. To do so, the ROS Middleware 
(RMW) in ROS 2 translates ROS messages into Interface Definition Language (IDL) messages 
that are supported by all DDS vendor implementations. To establish communications between 
nodes, the DDS framework provides for a set of discovery services, which enable nodes that 
subscribe to the same topic to dynamically discover one another. When a ROS node is 
initialized, it broadcasts its presence to all nodes on the same domain by using the Participant 
Discovery Protocol (PDP). Nodes then respond to this broadcast with their own data, including 
the type of QoS settings that they are using, via the Endpoint Discovery Protocol (EDP). 
Connections are then made between nodes if they are compatible in settings. Nodes also 
continue to periodically send out messages about their own data in order to allow for discovery 
by nodes that are newly created. 
Each DDS participant consists of a data reader and a data writer. The data reader and 
data writer are responsible for subscribing to the relevant topics and to read and write messages 
to other participants as necessary. DDS then makes use of the RTPS protocol to send messages 
on multicast and best-effort transports such as UDP [15]. QoS profiles are used to configure 
how the messages are sent and ensure that messages can still be sent in a reliable manner over 
the RTPS protocol if needed. 
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B. SIMULATION ARCHITECTURE 
The intent of the simulations is to evaluate the network performance of ROS 2 with 
different QoS and security settings. Different simulations are performed with a varying number 
of ROS 2 nodes in order to evaluate the impact of network performance when the number of 
ROS 2 nodes is scaled up. Studies involving ROS 2 network performance have previously 
involved either communications through a network loopback, or two separate computers 
connected by a wired or wireless network, as described in Chapter II.  
The use of a simulator allows the performance of ROS 2 on a wireless network to be 
studied without requiring a corresponding hardware. This allows us to study the impact of 
multiple ROS 2 nodes running in the same network. Our simulations utilize NS-3 to simulate 
a lossy wireless network between the ROS 2 nodes. NS-3 is a discrete-event network simulator 
that supports the use of different simulation models, allowing it to be used as a real-time 
network emulator [16]. An example of how virtual hosts can be used to simulate a virtual Wi-
Fi network is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. NS-3 network configuration for two nodes. Source: [17]. 
Our simulation architecture makes use of network namespaces to virtualize the 
network stack. Each network namespace creates its own network stack for processes within 
each unique network namespace, including its own network interfaces. For our simulations, 
a Wi-Fi network interface is created for each individual network namespace. Each ROS 2 
node is then executed within its own network namespace, with NS-3 simulating a Wi-Fi 
network connecting each ROS 2 node. Figure 4 depicts how five ROS 2 nodes within their 
own network namespace communicate with each other via the simulated NS-3 Wi-Fi. The 
instructions and script to initialize each network namespace is provided in the appendices. 
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Figure 4. Simulation architecture showing simulation of five ROS 2 nodes 
C. NS-3 SETTINGS 
NS-3 allows for simulations of different Wi-Fi models. The models used as well as 
the settings such as antenna strength and throughput can be changed as required. For our 
simulations, we used the following settings: 
• Wi-Fi standard: 802.11a 
• Type of network: Ad-hoc 
• Data mode: Constant rate OFDM 54 Mbps 
• Mobility Model: Constant Position 
The remaining settings were the default values provided by NS-3. 
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In NS-3, nodes are positioned using a 2D Cartesian coordinate system. Using the 
constant position model, the NS-3 simulator starts with nodes at a distance x from a central 
node. Figure 5 depicts how four ROS 2 Subscriber nodes are positioned around the central 
node, which contains the ROS 2 Publisher node. The simulation is run for two minutes, 
during which the data for the network performance is collected. After collection of the 
required data, the simulation is re-started with a new distance. Through multiple iterations 
of this process, network performance at different distances is measured. This provides data 
regarding network performance of ROS 2 in a lossy network for analysis. Although the 
position of the four Subscriber nodes does not affect network performance for the 
simulations in this thesis, the 2D Cartesian coordinate system allows for nodes to be 
appropriately positioned as required in future simulations. 
  
Figure 5. Top down view of the position of Subscriber nodes relative to 
Publisher node 
D. DDS VENDOR 
As described in Chapter II, DDS is a middleware framework that has been 
implemented by multiple vendors. Table 1 lists the different vendor implementations 
currently supported by ROS. The choice of RMW implementation is left to the user and 
Publisher
( 0 , 0 )
Subscriber
( 0 , x)
Subscriber
( x , 0 )
Subscriber
( 0 , -x )
Subscriber
( -x , 0 )
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can be made based on considerations such as license, platform availability, or an 
implementation that was designed to be targeted at a specific platform. Otherwise, the 
choice of DDS is considered agnostic to the running of ROS 2. The RMW used by ROS 
can be switched by changing the RMW_IMPLEMENTATION environment variable. For 
our experiments, we made use of eProsima Fast RTPS, an open-source DDS 
implementation. For the purpose of the simulations, only DDS settings, which can be 
accessed via the ROS 2 application layer, are used as variables. 
E. QOS POLICIES IN ROS 2 
QoS policies allow communication to occur in a reliable manner over a lossy 
wireless network even though messages are transmitted over the UDP transport layer. The 
policies can be applied specifically to each ROS node. This allows each node to be 
configured flexibly to meet requirements, depending on the type of network that is being 
used. A QoS profile is made up of different QoS policies. ROS 2 defines four default 
profiles: Default, Sensors, Parameters, and Services, defined with four policies each. If 
required, however, ROS 2 also allows specific policies in each QoS profile to be amended 
as necessary. Table 3 lists the details of the QoS policies used in the QoS profiles defined 
within ROS 2. The Services profile has the same policies as the Default profile, and thus 
is not specifically tested for in this thesis. 
Table 3. QoS policies for specific QoS profiles in ROS 2 
QoS profile History Depth Reliability Durability 
Default KEEP_LAST 10 RELIABLE VOLATILE 
Sensors KEEP_LAST 5 BEST_EFFORT VOLATILE 
Parameters KEEP_ALL 1000 RELIABLE VOLATILE 
Services KEEP_LAST 10 RELIABLE VOLATILE 
 
The QoS policies of Reliability, History, and Depth are used together to determine 
the overall reliability with which messages are sent between nodes. These policies affect 
the reliability of delivery of messages sent from Publisher to Subscriber nodes, especially 
in a lossy network.  
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The Reliability policy affects the level of reliability enforced by DDS in delivering 
messages to Subscribers. Within the Reliability policy, there are two sub-policies: 
RELIABLE and BEST_EFFORT. If the RELIABLE policy is used, the Publisher waits for 
an acknowledgment from the Subscriber after each message. If an acknowledgment is not 
received, the original message is re-transmitted by the Publisher until the Subscriber 
receives the message. If a BEST_EFFORT policy is used, the Publisher does not listen for 
any acknowledgment message, and transmits new messages as required.  
History controls whether messages are stored in the cache of the data writer or the 
data reader of a node. Within the History policy, there are two sub-policies: KEEP_LAST 
and KEEP_ALL. If a KEEP_ALL policy is used, all messages transmitted by a node are 
stored in the cache of the data writer, up to the system resource limit. If a KEEP_LAST 
policy is used, then the DEPTH parameter is used to determine the number of messages 
that are kept in the cache  
After nodes discover each other as part of the PDP, they exchange data about each 
other as part of the EDP. This data includes the index of the messages stored in the cache 
of the data writer and reader. Publisher nodes and Subscriber nodes compare the messages 
stored in their data writer and reader respectively, and the messages that are in the writer 
cache but not the reader cache are transmitted over the network. If a RELIABLE policy is 
used, this comparison of the writer and reader caches is performed as part of each message 
acknowledgment. If a BEST_EFFORT policy is used, this comparison is only done during 
EDP as part of discovery. Subsequently, only the latest message will be sent.  
Durability policies control what to do with nodes that join the network late. 
Durability has two sub-policies: TRANSIENT_LOCAL and VOLATILE. If the 
TRANSIENT_LOCAL policy is used, all messages stored in the cache of the data writer 
are sent over to the Subscriber. If the VOLATILE policy is used, data is not stored in the 
cache, and is not sent to any nodes that join the network later. In the case of our simulations, 
the Durability policies are not changed between simulations as all nodes are initialized and 
join the network together. Nevertheless, the policies are included as part of the QoS profiles 
that are shipped with ROS 2. 
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Before ROS 2 nodes are able to communicate, their QoS policies need to be 
compatible. With regards to the Durability policy, both Publisher and Subscriber need to 
be TRANSIENT_LOCAL before messages can be sent using the TRANSIENT_LOCAL 
policy. If a Subscriber is using a VOLATILE policy, both Subscriber and Publisher need 
to communicate using a VOLATILE policy, regardless of the policy used by the 
Subscriber. Similarly, for the Reliability policy, both Publisher and Subscriber need to be 
RELIABLE before messages can be sent using the RELIABLE policy. If a Subscriber is 
using a BEST_EFFORT policy, both Subscriber and Publisher communicate using a 
BEST_EFFORT policy, regardless of the policy used by the Subscriber. Table 4 
summarizes the compatibility of the QoS policies.  
Table 4. Summary of compatibility of QoS policies 
Policy Publisher Subscriber Result 
Durability 
VOLATILE VOLATILE VOLATILE 
VOLATILE TRANSIENT_LOCAL Not compatible 
TRANSIENT_LOCAL VOLATILE VOLATILE 
TRANSIENT_LOCAL TRANSIENT_LOCAL TRANSIENT_LOCAL 
Reliability 
BEST_EFFORT BEST_EFFORT BEST_EFFORT 
BEST_EFFORT RELIABLE Not compatible 
RELIABLE BEST_EFFORT BEST_EFFORT 
RELIABLE RELIABLE RELIABLE 
 
F. SECURITY SETTINGS 
SROS 2 makes use of three DDS-security SPIs, namely Authentication, Access 
Control and Cryptography. The DDS-security specifications provide compliance points 
associated with the implementation of the SPIs by vendors. Each vendor implements the 
specifications using plugins, which can be replaced by the user if so desired. However, all 
plugins must conform to the DDS-security specifications [10]. DDS-security provides the 
option of choosing which security plugins to use, including allowing configuration of 
which parts of the RTPS messages need to be encrypted. SROS 2, however, currently 
mandates the use of all three SPIs, without providing for finer control over the security 
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plugins that are used. A user can only either turn on all three SPIs on (turn security on), or 
not have any security at all (turn security off).  
The following paragraphs elaborate on the security plugins provided by the Fast-
RTPS DDS that is shipped by default with ROS 2. Nonetheless, the implementation of the 
SPIs is similar to other DDS vendors. By default, security support is not compiled for Fast-
RTPS, and must be activated by adding “-DSECURITY=ON” when compiling Fast-RTPS.  
1. Authentication 
The authentication plugin allows for mutual authentication between discovered 
nodes. After initial discovery, authentication must be completed before information can be 
exchanged between nodes. A trusted Certificate Authority (CA) is used as part of the 
authentication process. The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm is used to generate 
the public key [18]. The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method is then 
used to derive a shared key between both nodes.  
2. Access Control 
After a node is authenticated, validation of its permission is performed. Permissions 
for each node are configured through the use of two XML documents in the filesystem: 
governance.p7s and permissions.p7s. Both documents must be signed by the trusted CA 
using a X.509 certificate. The governance document provides control over how access 
control is enforced, while the permissions document expresses the type of access granted 
to each type of node for each specific topic.  
3. Cryptography 
The cryptography plugin used by Fast-RTPS provides authenticated encryption 
using Advanced Encryption Standard in Galois Counter Mode [18]. Message 
authentication is provided through message authentication codes (MACs) using Galois 
MAC. In Figure 6, a Wireshark capture of a message being sent in the clear is shown, while 
Figure 7 illustrates the Wireshark capture of the same message being encrypted.  
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Figure 6. Wireshark capture of message sent in the clear 
 
 
Figure 7. Wireshark capture of message encrypted 
G. CONFIGURING SECURITY SETTINGS IN ROS 2 
Security in ROS 2 can be turned on and off by configuring the ROS 2 environment 
variables. Figure 8 shows the environment variables that need to be configured. 
ROS_SECURITY_ROOT_DIRECTORY states the location where all security policies 
and keys are stored. ROS_SECURITY_ENABLE toggles whether security is turned on or 
off. If ROS_SECURITY_STRATEGY is set to Enforced, the node checks to ensure that 
the security keys are present. If it is not set as enforced, it allows the node to fall back to 
no security when the security keys are absent.  
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Figure 8. Commands to configure ROS 2 environment variables to enable 
security 
The “ros2 security create_permission” command is used to generate relevant 
security XML files expected by the DDS-security. A sample security policy file used to 
generate the relevant security XML keys is shown in Figure 9. The security policy allows 
for configuration of which nodes have access to which specific topics. In the Dashing 
Diademata release, keys are simply stored in the filesystem, with the ROS 2 roadmap 
promising to address key storage security [4]. Manually attempting to amend the security 
XML files to get finer control over the security settings used by the DDS would result in 
errors in the ROS 2 application.  
 
Figure 9. Example of a security policy. Adapted from [19]. 
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H. SYSTEM SETUP 
Simulations were performed on a single computer. The computer used for the 
simulations had the following hardware: 
• Processor: Intel(R) Core (TM) i7-8700K CPU @ 4.60GHz (6 cores) 
• Memory: 32 GB DDR4 
• OS: Ubuntu 18.04 
• ROS 2.0 version: Dashing Diademata Patch Release 1 
• NS-3 version: NS-3.29 
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IV. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
In this chapter, we discuss the results obtained from performing simulations using 
different QoS policies and with the security setting switched on or off. We also discuss the 
difference in network performance between having two and five ROS 2 nodes, in order to 
evaluate the impact of node scaling on the network performance.  
A. VALIDATION OF SECURITY SETTINGS 
In [20], the author demonstrated that the redesign of ROS 2 would enable it to be 
effective against rogue nodes and message spoofing. We modify the security certificates to 
verify that the security settings correctly protect against rogue nodes.  
1. Authentication 
Figure 10 depicts two scenarios in which a ROS 2 node fails to correctly 
authenticate itself, and the error messages that ROS 2 produces. The first scenario 
demonstrates how the node fails to initialize when no security certificate matches to the 
node. The second scenario demonstrates how the node fails the security initialization when 
the security keys are amended manually. This simulates a rogue node with a fake 
certificate.  
 
Figure 10. Error messages when the node fails to authenticate 
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2. Access Control 
Access to specific keys is dictated by an XML file used to create the security keys 
for the nodes. The XML file specifies the list of topics that each node has access to, either 
as a Publisher or as a Subscriber. Figure 11 shows the error given by ROS 2 when the node 
is attempting to access a node that it is not authorized to access. This results in the node 
failing to initialize.  
 
Figure 11. Screenshot of ROS 2 error when a node attempts to connect to an 
unauthorized topic 
B. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY FOR RESULTS 
In order to observe whether NS-3 correctly simulates packet loss in a wireless 
network, we performed a simulation using NS-3 without ROS 2. Packet sizes of 60 bytes 
were sent between two nodes in NS-3. Figure 12 illustrates the average percentage of 
packet loss at different distances for an 802.11a ad-hoc network. The results indicate that 
packet loss begins to increase at the 25 meter mark. 
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Figure 12. Rate of packet loss versus Distance (m) as simulated in NS-3 
Next, sets of simulations were carried out, each with a specific QoS profile and 
security setting. Each set consisted of a series of simulation runs in which the nodes were 
placed at different distances from one another. With different distances, the wireless 
network has a different simulated packet drop rate, which affects the message transmissions 
in ROS 2. 
For each simulation run, ROS 2 messages were published by a single Publisher 
node at a frequency of 2 Hz. Each simulation ran until either 200 messages were received 
by the Subscriber nodes or a time-out error was reached. Each message was 45 bytes long 
and consisted of a generic “Hello World!” string. A counter and time stamp were also 
appended to the message. For each run, the rate of message loss and the average latency 
incurred by each message was recorded. 
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1. Rate of Message Loss 
The rate of message loss is defined as the ratio of messages received by the 
Subscriber to the total messages that the Subscriber was supposed to receive. Each 
published message is stamped with a counter indicating the index of the message. Based 
on the counter in the message, the Subscriber node determines whether any message was 
not properly received. The Subscriber then compares the counter of the message received 
to that of the last message received. If the counter is not in running sequence, the Subscriber 
is able to determine the number of messages that were lost.  
2. Latency 
Latency is defined as the delay between the time that a specific message is 
published by a Publisher and the time that it is read by the Subscriber. Each message 
includes the system time of when the message was prepared. When the Subscriber receives 
a message, it compares the current system time with the system time included in the 
message. In this way, the measured latency includes the delay incurred by RMW to 
translate the message, the delay incurred by the DDS middleware to process each message 
packet, as well as the actual network propagation delay.  
C. NETWORK PERFORMANCE WITH DIFFERENT QOS SETTINGS 
We used the ROS 2 QoS profiles shown in Table 3 as a baseline to measure network 
performance. We ran additional simulations with QoS policies set at custom values in order 
to measure the specific impact of changing the settings of that specific QoS policy. 
Simulations were initially performed with one Publisher and one Subscriber node.  
1. Message Loss Rate 
The message loss rates for the three QoS profiles shipped with ROS 2 are shown in 
Figure 13. With a Sensor profile, the message loss rate starts to increase gradually as the 
distance between nodes is increased. This is to be expected as the Sensor profile utilizes a 
Best_Effort policy. As the distance between nodes increases, the rate of packet loss 
increases, similar to what is shown in Figure 12. Thus, the chance of a message being 
dropped increases as well.  
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Figure 13. Message Loss Rate versus Distance for QoS profiles shipped with 
ROS 2 
The Default profile has a Depth = 10 (see Table 3). The Default profile produced a 
lower message drop rate until 25.7m, as compared to using the Sensor profile. The Default 
profile utilizes a Reliable policy, which resends the messages if the Publisher does not 
receive an acknowledgment message from the Subscriber. Figure 14 shows the Wireshark 
capture of messages sent to and from the Publisher node. The Publisher regularly sends a 
heartbeat message to the Subscriber to check that the Subscriber is still connected to the 
network. The Subscriber then sends an acknowledgment message, either in the reply to the 
original message sent, or as a reply to the heartbeat message. The acknowledgment 
message includes a list of messages that have not been received by the Subscriber. The 
Publisher then immediately sends out these messages again, as long as the messages are 
still available in the writer cache.  
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Figure 14. Wireshark capture of packets sent from the Publisher node 
Yet, because the Publisher retransmits all the missing messages in a single packet, 
the message loss rate becomes larger than that experienced by the Sensor profile when the 
distance between nodes is larger than 25.7m. As seen in the highlighted row of Figure 14, 
the acknowledgment message in packet number 183 indicates that eight out of the past ten 
messages were not received. These eight messages were then retransmitted together in the 
next message, resulting in a packet size of 1006 bytes (shown in Figure 14). This is much 
larger than if only a single message was sent. In a lossy network, the larger packet size 
results in a higher chance of packet loss. As such, the retransmission of messages was too 
large to be successfully transmitted to the Subscriber node.  
With retransmission of messages usually not being successful after 25.7 m, the 
Default profile has a higher message drop rate than the Sensor profile. This is due to the 
Default profile transmitting the heartbeat message together with the message data in a 
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single packet. This results in packets that are much larger than if the Sensor profile was 
used. The overall effect is a higher message drop rate using the Default profile.  
The Parameter profile has a History policy of Keep_All and a Depth policy of 1000. 
As such, the packets that are sent are very large, as it would include both the current 
message as well as all past messages. In this situation, either the Subscriber receives all the 
messages or all the messages are dropped. It performs slightly better than the Sensor profile 
for a small set of distances (24.8 m–25.3 m), as the Subscriber can still retrieve any dropped 
messages from subsequent message deliveries. When the network gets more lossy with 
increased distance, however, none of the messages manage to be delivered; the packet drop 
rate for such a large packet size was very high.  
In our next experiment, the Depth of the Default profile is changed to one, and the 
results of the simulations are compared to that of the original Default profile (Depth = 10). 
The results are shown in Figure 15. With Depth = 1, the network performs similarly to that 
of the Sensor profile, with only a slightly higher message loss rate. This is due to the fact 
that with a Depth policy of only one, the Subscriber is unable to retransmit most of the 
dropped messages, and thus initially exhibits a higher message drop rate. Since the packet 
sizes are smaller due to the smaller depth size, even with greater distance, more packets are 
delivered as compared to the profile with a large Depth (Depth = 10).  
Although the message drop rate of the Default profile with a Depth of one is similar 
to that of the Sensor profile, it is overall slightly higher. This is because the packet sizes 
sent using the Default profile are higher than that of Sensor profile, due to the inclusion of 
the heartbeat message.  
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Figure 15. Comparison of Message Loss Rate when Depth = 1 and Depth = 10 
for Default 
2. Latency 
The simulation results that measure the impact of the QoS profiles on latency are 
plotted on two separate graphs. The first graph plots the latency for distances from 0 to 24 
m, while the second graph examines the latency from 24 m and beyond. As seen in Figure 
12, given a packet size of 60 bytes, packet loss occurs starting at 25 m. As such, in order 
to review the impact that the QoS profiles have on a lossless network, we first evaluate the 
latency from 0 to 24 m for the different QoS profiles. We also separately look at the results 
between 24 and 26 m to review the impact QoS profiles have in a lossy wireless network.  
The latency of the messages when the QoS profiles from Table 3 are used is shown 
in Figure 16. As distance is increased, the latency increases as well, due to the impact of 
propagation delay. The Sensor profile demonstrated the least latency, with the Default and 
Parameters profiles exhibiting a much higher latency. This higher latency is attributable to 
processing time by the RMW, which translates the messages from ROS 2 to IDL messages 
transmitted by the DDS middleware.  
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Figure 16. Latency of messages with different QoS profiles 
We next compare the impact of the Default profile versus the Sensor profile on 
latency. The results are shown in Figure 17. As the distance increases, the network 
experiences increasing packet loss. Accordingly, the latency for messages with the Default 
profile increases significantly. This is due to the time incurred from the retransmission of 
messages not received by the Subscriber node. This can take multiple retransmissions in a 
lossy environment, with the Subscriber node receiving the message much later than when 
it was originally sent by the Publisher node. 
There is no significant trend for using the Parameters profile, as all messages are 
dropped from distances 25.2 m and beyond (as was shown in Figure 13). 
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Figure 17. Latency of messages with different QoS profiles in a lossy network 
D. SIMULATION RESULTS WITH SECURITY ON AND OFF 
We next study the performance of ROS 2 when security is turned off or on. The 
results shown in Figures 18–20 depict the message loss rates for the QoS profiles from 
Table 3 with security turned on and off. Simulations were performed with one Publisher 
and one Subscriber node. It can be seen that for all profiles (Sensor, Default and 
Parameters), messages are dropped at a shorter distance when security is turned on as 
compared to when security is turned off. Wireshark captures of the transmitted packets 
using the Default profile, as shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22, illustrate the overhead 
incurred when security is turned off or on, respectively. The packet size when security is 
turned off is 170 bytes versus 330 bytes when security is turned on. The larger the packet 
size, the more likely the message is to be dropped. 
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Figure 21. Wireshark capture showing size of messages with security turned off 
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Figure 22. Wireshark capture showing size of messages with security turned on 
In Figure 24 to Figure 26, we show the latency of the messages using the QoS 
profiles from Table 3 and when security is turned on and off. In Figure 21, it can be seen 
that from 0 to 24 m, the Sensor profile incurs an average of 19% overhead. The Default 
profile incurs an average 60% overhead for that same distance (Figure 24) while the 
Parameter profile incurs an average of 32% overhead for that same distance (Figure 25). 
There is a higher overhead incurred for the Default profile because the packet size is larger, 
and therefore, the process to encrypt the packet is more time consuming. The overhead 
incurred is also dependent on the processing power used to encrypt the messages.  
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Figure 23. Latency of messages with the Sensor profile and with security turned 
on and off (0-24 m) 
 
 
Figure 24. Latency of messages with the Default profile and with security turned 
on and off (0-24 m) 
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Figure 25. Latency of messages with the Parameter profile and with security 
turned on and off (0-24 m) 
 
Figure 26 and Figure 27 show the impact on latency with security turned on and off 
for the Sensor profile and the Default profile in a lossy network, respectively. Latency 
increases for both profiles when security is turned on. In Figure 26, it can be seen that from 
24 m, the latency starts to increase immediately with security turned on, as compared to 
24.5 m with security turned off. Using the Default profile, latency starts to increase at 24.7 
m with security turned on as compared to 25.2 m with security turned off, as shown in 
Figure 27. In order to achieve a comparable latency with security turned on for both 
profiles, the distance between nodes must be decreased by 0.5 m. For example, to achieve 
a latency of 4000 ms, the distance between nodes can go up to 25.7 m with security turned 
off. With security turned on, however, the distance between nodes can only go up to 25.2 
m to achieve a latency of 4000 ms.  
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Figure 26. Latency of messages for the Sensor profile with security turned on 
and off (beyond 24 m) 
 
 
Figure 27. Latency of messages for the Default profile with security turned on 
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E. IMPACT ON NETWORK SCALE ON PERFORMANCE 
In this section, we compare the network performance of ROS 2 when the number 
of nodes in our simulations is increased to five. 
1. Message Drop Rate 
Figure 28 compares the message drop rates using the Sensor profile when the 
network has two nodes (one Publisher and one Subscriber) and five nodes (one Publisher 
and four Subscribers). The results show that as long as the network has sufficient 
bandwidth, the message drop rate is not affected when scaling up to more nodes when using 
the Sensor profile. Nevertheless, there is a difference when the Default profile is used. 
Figure 29 shows that five nodes have a lower message drop rate with the Default profile 
than when the network has only two nodes with the Default profile. When the network has 
only two nodes, the Publisher node sends out all unreceived messages in a single packet, 
as was shown in Figure 14. In Figure 30, the Wireshark capture for the Default profile with 
five nodes is shown. As seen in Figure 30, after the Publisher receives an acknowledgment 
message that the Subscriber has not received multiple messages, it sends out those 
messages in individual packets in sequence. This results in the Publisher resending dropped 
messages in smaller packets. These smaller packets are less likely to be dropped as 




Figure 28. Message drop rates comparing two nodes and five nodes with the 
Sensor profile 
 




Figure 30. Wireshark capture of packets sent by Publisher node with five nodes 
in the network and using the Default profile 
2. Latency 
ROS 2 transmits each message sequentially to each individual node. This means 
that for a single message with four Subscribers, the same message is transmitted four times. 
This is depicted in the Wireshark capture shown in Figure 31. These sequential 
transmissions result in a significant increase in latency as more nodes are added to the 
network. Table 5 shows the latency experienced by each node in a five-node network that 
has one Publisher and four Subscribers as compared to the latency in a two-node network 
with only one Subscriber.  
 
Figure 31. Wireshark capture of messages sent by Publisher 
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Table 5. Latency of Messages for each node in a one Subscriber network 








Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 
Sensor 614 292 684 854 10 645 701 20 617 056 30 396 675 
Default 639 480  712 332 10 706 034 20 725 019 30 793 318 
Parameters 647 597 716 007 10 724 211 20 734 675 31 384 246 
 
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The simulation results demonstrated that the integration of NS-3 as a simulation 
platform for ROS 2 is useful and an effective way to rapidly test network performance. The 
different QoS profiles affect the network performance in distinctive ways. The results from 
the various simulations demonstrated the trade-offs in network performance when using 
different QoS profiles. The Sensor profile delivers messages as quickly as possible, with a 
minimal impact on latency. It also outperforms the Default profile in terms of message 
drop rate in a network of high wireless loss. The Parameter profile has a large depth to 
cater to situations where the Subscriber node is repeatedly unable to reach the Publisher 
node. This results in a larger latency compared to the other profiles. In addition, the 
percentage of messages delivered is either 100% or 0% and would be not be suitable for 
all occasions. 
There was also significant overhead when security settings were turned on. Using 
the Default profile, it incurred a 60% increase in latency, with the overhead likely to be 
much higher if performed using a slower processor. The overhead from having security 
turned on also meant a higher message drop rate across all QoS profiles. 
Scaling up the number of nodes in the network to five nodes from two nodes 
resulted in varying consequences with the use of different QoS settings. Of significance is 
the increase in latency when the Default profile is used. It is likely that in a swarm network 
with 30–50 unmanned assets, a Reliable QoS policy cannot be used at all as the latency 




In this thesis, we proposed and validated a simulation architecture to study the 
network performance of ROS 2 using varying QoS profiles and security settings. The 
integration of ROS 2 with the NS-3 network simulator is unique to this thesis, and it was 
shown that the simulation architecture is effective for rapidly studying ROS 2 network 
performance.  
Using the Default profile allows messages to be delivered in a reliable manner. 
Nonetheless, this comes at a cost of increased latency as compared to using the Sensor 
profile. The Sensor profile delivers messages as quickly as possible, with a minimal impact 
on latency. It also outperforms the Default profile in terms of message drop rate in a 
network of high packet losses. 
Turning on the security features results in significant overhead in terms of latency, 
while producing a much higher message drop rate. In addition, scaling up the network to 
five nodes resulted in a significant increase in latency, with messages sent sequentially. On 
the other hand, it did result in an unexpectedly better performance in terms of message drop 
rate when the Default profile was used. As ROS 2 continues to evolve, the network 
performance of ROS 2 in a swarm network needs to be addressed, as it is not viable to scale 
up the number of nodes to a significant swarm due to the existing impact on latency. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The work in this thesis contributes towards evaluating and configuring ROS 2 
parameters for different unmanned system use cases, while providing a simulation 
framework on which tests can be run. Additional research would contribute towards the 
evaluations of the network performance of ROS 2.  
1. Tuning of Additional QoS and Security Settings 
There are many DDS settings that can affect ROS 2 network performance. Most of 
these settings are not available to the user for fine-tuning in the current ROS 2 Dashing 
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Diademata version. For example, DDS allows for specific security plugins to be turned on 
or off individually, but ROS 2 only allows security settings to be turned on or off entirely. 
As these setting controls are exposed in the future through ROS 2, additional work would 
have to be performed to evaluate their impact on network performance. 
2. Use Case for a Swarm UxS Network 
This thesis demonstrated the trade-offs in network performance incurred by 
different QoS and security settings. It would be useful to formulate a use case in a swarm 
UxS network using the appropriate QoS settings and validate the network performance 
through the simulation architecture.  
3. Performance Testing through Actual Hardware 
Simulations through the use of NS-3 allowed us to rapidly test and prototype 
networks of different settings. It would still be important to test out the network 
performance using actual hardware. A typical UxS would not have the processing power 
used in the simulations of this thesis. This will have an impact on the network performance 
with different QoS and security settings and will need to be validated. 
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APPENDIX A. SCRIPT TO GENERATE NAMESPACES 




# calculate IP values given index 
def _ip_from_index(i): 
  if i < 1 or i > pow(2,20)//3: 
      raise Exception(“bad”) 
 
  # wifi IP values are contiguous starting at 1 
  j=(i-1)*3+1 
  k=(i-1)*3+2 
  l=(i-1)*3+3 
  wifi_veth = “10.%d.%d.%d/9”%(j//65536, (j//256)%256, j%256) 
  wifi_vethb = “10.%d.%d.%d/9”%(k//65536, (k//256)%256, k%256) 
  wifi_tap = “10.%d.%d.%d/9”%(l//65536, (l//256)%256, l%256) 
 
  # direct IP values are triplets step 8 starting at 1 
  j=(i-1)*8+1 
  k=(i-1)*8+2 
  l=(i-1)*8+3 
  direct_br = “10.%d.%d.%d/29”%(128+j//65536, (j//256)%256, j%256) 
  direct_vethn = “10.%d.%d.%d/29”%(128+k//65536, (k//256)%256, k%256) 
  direct_default = “10.%d.%d.%d”%(128+l//65536, (l//256)%256, l%256) 
 
  return wifi_veth, wifi_vethb, wifi_tap, \ 
         direct_br, direct_vethn, direct_default 
 
# create tap device: ip tuntap add tap1 mode tap; ip link set dev tap1 up 
 





  print(“Command: %s”%cmd) 




  # network namespace 
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  _run_cmd(“ip netns add nns%d”%i) 
 
  # enable loopback - helps Ctrl-C activate on first rather than second 




  wifi_veth, wifi_vethb, wifi_tap, direct_br, direct_vethn, direct_default = \ 
                  _ip_from_index(i) 
 
  # create veth pair 
  _run_cmd(“ip link add wifi_veth%d type veth peer name wifi_vethb%d”%( 
                                                                    i,i)) 
  _run_cmd(“ip address add %s dev wifi_vethb%d”%(wifi_vethb,i)) 
 
  # associate wifi_veth with nns 
  _run_cmd(“ip link set wifi_veth%d netns nns%d”%(i,i)) 
 
  # set wifi_veth IP at nns 
  _run_cmd(“ip netns exec nns%d ip addr add %s “ 
           “ dev wifi_veth%d”%(i, wifi_veth, i)) 
 
  # create bridge 
  _run_cmd(“ip link add name wifi_br%d type bridge”%i) 
 
  # bring up bridge and veth pair 
  _run_cmd(“ip link set wifi_br%d up”%i) 
  _run_cmd(“ip link set wifi_vethb%d up”%i) 
  _run_cmd(“ip netns exec nns%d ip link set wifi_veth%d up”%(i,i)) 
 
  # add wifi_vethb to bridge 
  _run_cmd(“ip link set wifi_vethb%d master wifi_br%d”%(i,i)) 
 
  # create tap device 
  _run_cmd(“ip tuntap add wifi_tap%d mode tap”%i) 
  _run_cmd(“ip addr flush dev wifi_tap%d”%i) # clear IP 
  _run_cmd(“ip address add %s dev wifi_tap%d”%(wifi_tap, i)) 
  _run_cmd(“ip link set wifi_tap%d up”%i) 
 
  # add tap to bridge 




  wifi_veth, wifi_vethb, wifi_tap, direct_br, direct_vethn, direct_default = \ 
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                  _ip_from_index(i) 
 
  # direct bridge 
  _run_cmd(“ip link add direct_br%d type bridge”%i) 
 
  # direct veth pair 
  _run_cmd(“ip link add direct_veth%d type veth peer name direct_vethn%d”%( 
                                                                      i,i)) 
 
  # veth to bridge 
  _run_cmd(“ip link set direct_veth%d up”%i) 
  _run_cmd(“ip link set direct_veth%d master direct_br%d”%(i,i)) 
 
  # bridge IP 
  _run_cmd(“ip address add %s dev direct_br%d “%(direct_br,i)) 
 
  # veth to nns 
  _run_cmd(“ip link set direct_vethn%d netns nns%d”%(i,i)) 
  _run_cmd(“ip netns exec nns%d ip addr add %s “ 
           “dev direct_vethn%d”%(i,direct_vethn,i)) 
  _run_cmd(“ip netns exec nns%d ip link set direct_vethn%d up”%(i,i)) 
  _run_cmd(“ip netns exec nns%d ip route add default via %s”%(i,direct_default)) 
 
  # bridge up 




  # wifi 
  _run_cmd(“ip link set wifi_br%d down”%i) 
  _run_cmd(“ip link set wifi_tap%d down”%i) 
  _run_cmd(“ip link set wifi_vethb%d down”%i) 
  _run_cmd(“ip link delete wifi_vethb%d”%i) 
  _run_cmd(“ip link delete wifi_tap%d”%i) 
  _run_cmd(“ip link delete wifi_br%d type bridge”%i) 
 
def do_teardown_direct(i): 
  # direct 
  _run_cmd(“ip link set direct_br%d down”%i) 
  _run_cmd(“ip link delete direct_br%d”%i) 
  _run_cmd(“ip link set direct_veth%d down”%i) 
  _run_cmd(“ip link delete direct_veth%d”%i) 
 
def do_teardown_nns(i): 
  # network namespace 
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  DEFAULT_COUNT=5 
  parser = ArgumentParser(prog=‘lxc_setup.py’, 
                          description=“Manage containers used with ns-3.”) 
  parser.add_argument(“command,” type=str, help=“The command to execute.”, 
                      choices=[“setup,” “teardown”]) 
  parser.add_argument(“-c,” “--count,” type=int, default=DEFAULT_COUNT, 
                      help=“The number of network namespaces to set up for, “ 
                           “default %d.”%DEFAULT_COUNT) 
  parser.add_argument(“-d,” “--include_direct,” action=“store_true”, 
                      help=“Suppress direct connection setup”) 
  args = parser.parse_args() 
 
  print(“Providing ‘%s’ services for %d network namespaces...”%( 
                                           args.command, args.count)) 
 
  if args.command == “setup”: 
      for i in range(1,args.count+1): 
          do_setup_nns(i) 
          do_setup_wifi(i) 
          if args.include_direct: 
              do_setup_direct(i) 
  elif args.command == “teardown”: 
      for i in range(1,args.count+1): 
          do_teardown_wifi(i) 
          if args.include_direct: 
              do_teardown_direct(i) 
          do_teardown_nns(i) 
  else: 
      print(“Invalid command: %s”%args.command) 
      sys.exit(1) 
 
  print(“Done providing ‘%s’ services for %d network namespaces.”%( 





APPENDIX B. ROS 2 PUBLISHER SCRIPT 
The following script is used to generate the ROS 2 Publisher node. The script 










using namespace std::chrono_literals; 
 
class Talker: public rclcpp::Node { 
public: explicit Talker(const std::string & topic_name, 
  const std::string & zlvarmsg, 
    const std::int16_t & qos1, 
      const std::size_t & qos2, 
        const std::int16_t & qos3, 
          const std::int16_t & qos4, 
            const std::int16_t & zlcount): Node(“talker”) { 
  msg_ = std::make_shared < std_msgs::msg::String > (); 
 
  // Create a function for when messages are to be sent. 
  auto publish_message = [ & ]() - > void { 
 
    auto now = std::chrono::high_resolution_clock::now(); 
    auto now_ns = std::chrono::time_point_cast < std::chrono::nanoseconds > (now); 
    auto value = now_ns.time_since_epoch(); 
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    long duration = value.count(); 
 
    msg_ - > data = “Hi!” + zlvarmsg + “ : “ + std::to_string(count_++) + “ % “ + 
      std::to_string(duration); 
 
    RCLCPP_INFO(this - > get_logger(), “Publishing: ‘%s’,” msg_ - > data.c_str()); 
 
    pub_ - > publish(msg_); 
 
    if (count_ == zlcount) { 
      rclcpp::shutdown(); 
    } 
 
  }; 
 
  auto var1 = RMW_QOS_POLICY_HISTORY_KEEP_LAST;; 
  auto var3 = RMW_QOS_POLICY_RELIABILITY_RELIABLE; 
  auto var4 = RMW_QOS_POLICY_DURABILITY_VOLATILE; 
 
  if (qos1 == 2) { 
    var1 = RMW_QOS_POLICY_HISTORY_KEEP_ALL; 
  } 
  if (qos3 == 2) { 
    var3 = RMW_QOS_POLICY_RELIABILITY_BEST_EFFORT; 
  } 
  if (qos4 == 2) { 
    var4 = RMW_QOS_POLICY_DURABILITY_TRANSIENT_LOCAL; 
  } 
 
  rmw_qos_profile_t custom_qos_profile = { 
    var1, 
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    qos2, 
    var3, 
    var4, 
    false 
  }; 
 
  pub_ = this - > create_publisher < std_msgs::msg::String > (topic_name, 
    custom_qos_profile); 
 
  // Use a timer to schedule periodic message publishing. 
  timer_ = this - > create_wall_timer(500 ms, publish_message); 
} 
 
private: size_t count_ = 1; 
std::shared_ptr < std_msgs::msg::String > msg_; 




int main(int argc, char * argv []) { 
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, BUFSIZ); 
 
if (rcutils_cli_option_exist(argv, argv + argc, “-h”)) { 
  print_usage(); 





// Parse the command line options. 
auto topic = std::string(“chatter”); 
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char * cli_option = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-t”); 
if (nullptr != cli_option) { 
  topic = std::string(cli_option); 
} 
 
auto msg_string = std::string(“ Hello World! “); 
char * zl_string = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-s”); 
if (nullptr != zl_string) { 
  msg_string = std::string(zl_string); 
} 
 
std::int16_t zqos1 = 1; 
char * qos_choice1 = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-q1”); 
if (nullptr != qos_choice1) { 
  zqos1 = std::atoi(qos_choice1); 
} 
 
std::size_t zqos2 = 10; 
char * qos_choice2 = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-q2”); 
if (nullptr != qos_choice2) { 
  zqos2 = std::atoi(qos_choice2); 
} 
 
std::int16_t zqos3 = 1; 
char * qos_choice3 = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-q3”); 
if (nullptr != qos_choice3) { 
  zqos3 = std::atoi(qos_choice3); 
} 
 
std::int16_t zqos4 = 1; 
char * qos_choice4 = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-q4”); 
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if (nullptr != qos_choice4) { 
  zqos4 = std::atoi(qos_choice4); 
} 
 
std::int16_t zzlcount = 15; 
char * cou = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-c”); 
if (nullptr != cou) { 
  zzlcount = std::atoi(cou); 
} 
 
auto node = std::make_shared < Talker > (topic, msg_string, zqos1, zqos2, zqos3, 
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APPENDIX C. ROS 2 SUBSCRIBER SCRIPT 
The following script is used to generate the ROS 2 Subscriber node. The script 










class ListenerBestEffort : public rclcpp::Node { 
public: 
  ListenerBestEffort(const std::int16_t& qos1, const std::size_t& qos2, const 
std::int16_t& qos3, const std::int16_t& qos4, const std::int16_t& distance, const 
std::int16_t& duration_time) 
      : Node(“listener”) 
  { 
 
      auto callback = 
 
          [&](const typename std_msgs::msg::String::SharedPtr msg) -> void { 
 
          int totalpacket = 30; //number of initial packet to ignore 
          long time; 
 
          counter++; 
 
          if (counter == 1) { 
              auto initial = std::chrono::high_resolution_clock::now(); 
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          } 
 
          //get time 
          auto now = std::chrono::high_resolution_clock::now(); 
          auto now_ns = std::chrono::time_point_cast<std::chrono::nanoseconds>(now); 
          auto value = now_ns.time_since_epoch(); 
          long duration = value.count(); 
 
          if (counter > 1) { 
              std::chrono::duration<double, std::micro> Elapsed = now - initial; 
  auto zlabc=((duration_time)*1000000)-1000000; 
 
              if (Elapsed.count() >= zlabc) { 
 
                  using namespace std; 
         if(lostpacket<0) {                     rclcpp::shutdown(); 
              } 
                  ofstream myfile(“result.txt,” std::ios_base::app); 
                  if (myfile.is_open()) { 
                      myfile << qos1 << “,”; 
                      myfile << qos2 << “,”; 
                      myfile << qos3 << “,”; 
                      myfile << qos4 << “,”; 
                      myfile << distance << “,”; 
                      myfile << lostpacket << “,”; 
                      myfile << receivedpacket << “,”; 
                      myfile << totallatency / receivedpacket << “,”; 
                      myfile << packetnumber << “,”; 
                      myfile << “\n”; 
                      myfile.close(); 
                  } 
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                  else { 
                      cout << “Unable to open file”; } 
 
                  rclcpp::shutdown(); 
              } 
          } 
 
          std::string zlstr = msg->data; //copies the data in C++ format 
 
          packetnumber = std::stoi(zlstr.substr(zlstr.find(“:”) + 2)); 
          time = std::stol(zlstr.substr(zlstr.find(“%”) + 2)); 
 
 
          if (packetnumber >= totalpacket) { 
  if (lastpacket == 0) {lastpacket=packetnumber-1;} 
              totallatency = totallatency + (duration - time); 
              RCLCPP_INFO(this->get_logger(), “I heard: [%s],” msg->data.c_str()); 
 
              if (packetnumber - lastpacket != 1) { 
                  lostpacket = lostpacket + (packetnumber - lastpacket - 1); 
              } 
              lastpacket = packetnumber; 
 




              receivedpacket++; 
          } 
          else { 
              lostpacket = 0; 
          } 
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         if(lostpacket<0) {                     rclcpp::shutdown(); 
              } 
 
      }; 
 
      auto var1 = RMW_QOS_POLICY_HISTORY_KEEP_LAST; 
      ; 
      //auto var2=10; 
      auto var3 = RMW_QOS_POLICY_RELIABILITY_RELIABLE; 
      auto var4 = RMW_QOS_POLICY_DURABILITY_VOLATILE; 
 
      if (qos1 == 2) { 
          var1 = RMW_QOS_POLICY_HISTORY_KEEP_ALL; 
      } 
      if (qos3 == 2) { 
          var3 = RMW_QOS_POLICY_RELIABILITY_BEST_EFFORT; 
      } 
      if (qos4 == 2) { 
          var4 = RMW_QOS_POLICY_DURABILITY_TRANSIENT_LOCAL; 
      } 
 
      rmw_qos_profile_t custom_qos_profile = { 
          var1, qos2, var3, var4, 
          false 
      }; 
 
      sub_ = create_subscription<std_msgs::msg::String>( 
          “chatter,” callback, custom_qos_profile); 




  size_t counter = 0; 
  long totallatency = 0; 
  int receivedpacket = 1; 
  int lostpacket = 0; 
  int packetnumber = 1; 
  int lastpacket = 0; 
  std::chrono::time_point<std::chrono::system_clock> initial = 
std::chrono::high_resolution_clock::now(); 
  rclcpp::Subscription<std_msgs::msg::String>::SharedPtr sub_; 
}; 
 
int main(int argc, char* argv []) 
{ 
  // Force flush of the stdout buffer. 
  setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, BUFSIZ); 
 
  rclcpp::init(argc, argv); 
 
  std::int16_t zqos1 = 1; 
  char* qos_choice1 = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-q1”); 
  if (nullptr != qos_choice1) { 
      zqos1 = std::atoi(qos_choice1); 
  } 
 
  std::size_t zqos2 = 10; 
  char* qos_choice2 = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-q2”); 
  if (nullptr != qos_choice2) { 
      zqos2 = std::atoi(qos_choice2); 
  } 
 
  std::int16_t zqos3 = 1; 
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  char* qos_choice3 = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-q3”); 
  if (nullptr != qos_choice3) { 
      zqos3 = std::atoi(qos_choice3); 
  } 
 
  std::int16_t zqos4 = 1; 
  char* qos_choice4 = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-q4”); 
  if (nullptr != qos_choice4) { 
      zqos4 = std::atoi(qos_choice4); 
  } 
 
  std::int16_t zzlcount = 15; 
  char* cou = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-c”); 
  if (nullptr != cou) { 
      zzlcount = std::atoi(cou); 
  } 
 
  std::int16_t distance = 1; 
  char* dis = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-d”); 
  if (nullptr != dis) { 
      distance = std::atoi(dis); 
  } 
 
  std::int16_t time = 30; 
  char* ztime = rcutils_cli_get_option(argv, argv + argc, “-t”); 
  if (nullptr != ztime) { 
      time = std::atoi(ztime); 
  } 
  auto Start = std::chrono::high_resolution_clock::now(); 




  while (1) { 
      auto End = std::chrono::high_resolution_clock::now(); 
      std::chrono::duration<double, std::milli> Elapsed = End - Start; 
 
      rclcpp::spin_some(node); 
 
      if (Elapsed.count() >= ((time) * 1000) + 10000) { 
          break; 
      } 
  } 
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APPENDIX D. NS-3 SIMULATOR SCRIPT 











// network devices, do not exceed COUNT in nns_setup.py 
static const int COUNT=5; 
 





main (int argc, char *argv []) 
{ 
double distance = 1.0; 
int zltime = 60; 
 
CommandLine cmd; 
 cmd.AddValue (“distance,” “Distance apart to place nodes (in meters).”, 
               distance); 
 cmd.AddValue (“time,” “time to run experiment (in seconds).”, 
               zltime); 
cmd.Parse (argc, argv); 
distance=distance/10; 
std::cout << “Providing ns-3 Wifi network emulation for “ << COUNT << “ devices\
n”; 
std::cout << “Distance: “ << distance << “ \n”; 
std::cout << “Time: “ << zltime << “ \n”; 
 
GlobalValue::Bind (“SimulatorImplementationType,” StringValue 
(“ns3::RealtimeSimulatorImpl”)); 














YansWifiChannelHelper wifiChannel = YansWifiChannelHelper::Default (); 
YansWifiPhyHelper wifiPhy = YansWifiPhyHelper::Default (); 
wifiPhy.SetChannel (wifiChannel.Create ()); 
 
NetDeviceContainer devices = wifi.Install (wifiPhy, wifiMac, nodes); 
 
MobilityHelper mobility; 
Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc = CreateObject<ListPositionAllocator> (); 
for (int i=0; i<COUNT; i++) { 
    positionAlloc->Add (Vector (0.0, 0.0, 0.0)); 
positionAlloc->Add (Vector (distance, 0.0, 0.0)); 
positionAlloc->Add (Vector (-distance, 0.0, 0.0)); 
positionAlloc->Add (Vector (0.0, distance, 0.0)); 







tapBridge.SetAttribute (“Mode,” StringValue (“UseLocal”)); 
char buffer [10]; 
for (int i=0; i<COUNT; i++) { 
  sprintf(buffer, “wifi_tap%d,” i+1); 
  tapBridge.SetAttribute (“DeviceName,” StringValue(buffer)); 
  tapBridge.Install (nodes.Get(i), devices.Get(i)); 
} 
 
 Simulator::Stop (Seconds (zltime)); 
 Simulator::Run (); 
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